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OPINION OF THE COURT 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
Dissatisfied with the stock and reliability of power-
generating facilities in New Jersey, the state adopted the Long 
Term Capacity Pilot Program Act. The Act—known as 
LCAPP—instructed New Jersey’s Board of Public Utilities to 
promote the construction of new power-generating facilities 
in the state. Rather than pay for the construction of these 
plants directly, the Board of Public Utilities crafted a set of 
contracts, called Standard Offer Capacity Agreements, that 
assured new electric energy generators fifteen years of 
revenue from local utilities and, ultimately, New Jersey 
ratepayers. LCAPP guaranteed revenue to new generators by 
fixing the rates those generators would receive for supplying 
electrical capacity, that is, the ability to make energy when 
called upon.  
The federal government, however, has exclusive control 
over interstate rates for wholesales of electric capacity. So 
when New Jersey arranged for LCAPP generators to receive 
preferential capacity rates, the state entered into a field of 
regulation beyond its authority. Accordingly, federal law 
preempts, and thereby invalidates, LCAPP and the related 
Standard Offer Capacity Agreements. We, therefore, affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
Although we affirm, we address our opinion to the field of 
interstate rates, and not to electric energy markets generally. 
Moreover, because we determine that LCAPP has been field 
preempted, we do not reach the conflict preemption and 
dormant Commerce Clause arguments raised by the parties. 
12 
 
I. Background of the Case  
This case concerns New Jersey’s authority to arrange for 
the construction of new electric generators through a scheme 
focused on capacity prices. New Jersey’s legislation, and its 
reasons for pursuing it, make sense only in the broader 
context of the regional energy market. Our analysis begins 
there. 
 A. Regulatory framework 
Electric energy generation and transmission occur in a 
complex regulatory environment populated with multiple 
private and public actors operating under the supervision of 
both state and federal agencies. The Federal Power Act 
embodies Congress’s attempt “to reconcile the claims of 
federal and of local authorities and to apportion federal and 
state jurisdiction over the industry.” Conn. Light & Power 
Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 531 (1945). 
1. Both the federal government and the states regulate 
aspects of the electric energy system. 
With the Federal Power Act, Congress placed “the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the 
sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce” 
under federal control. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). Through the Act, 
Congress exercised its Commerce Clause prerogative to 
regulate matters of interstate commerce that the states could 
not. Cf. Public Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & 
Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927) (holding that the 
regulation of wholesale energy transactions that are 
“fundamentally interstate from beginning to end” may come 
only from the “exercise of the power vested in Congress.”). 
And Congress further extended federal authority to those 
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electric energy matters indirectly related to interstate 
commerce that had previously been subject to state 
regulation. See New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002).  
But Congress preserved state authority over many aspects 
of the electric energy industry. The Federal Power Act 
disclaimed any attempt to regulate “any other sale of electric 
energy” and declared that federal regulators “shall not have 
jurisdiction, except as specifically provided . . . over facilities 
used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities 
used in local distribution or only for the transmission of 
electric energy in intrastate commerce.” 16 U.S.C. § 
824(b)(1). So while the federal government has exclusive 
control over interstate rates and transmission, the “[n]eed for 
new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and 
services, are areas that have been characteristically governed 
by the States.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983). 
2. FERC has exclusive authority over interstate 
capacity sales and transmissions, and it has 
exercised that authority through regional 
transmission organizations. 
With respect to electric energy sales and transmissions, 
the federal government has placed one agency in charge of 
implementing the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission. This agency, known as FERC, 
“regulates the sale of electricity at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.” Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 
U.S. 39, 41 (2003). FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate 
wholesale rates is exclusive. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. 
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986). Accordingly, FERC 
alone has the responsibility to “ensure that wholesale rates are 
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just and reasonable.” Entergy La., Inc., 539 U.S. at 41 
(quotation marks omitted); 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).  
While FERC once directly considered whether the 
wholesale rates submitted to it were “just and reasonable,” the 
agency has since moved away from this approach. Now 
FERC favors using market mechanisms to produce 
competitive rates for interstate sales and transmissions of 
energy. As part of this approach, FERC oversees regional 
transmission organizations that facilitate market operations.  
PJM Interconnection LLC operates as the federally 
regulated regional transmission organization for the PJM 
region. PJM takes its name from “Pennsylvania,” “Jersey,” 
and “Maryland,” the home states of the first utilities to pool 
their excess power and capacity in 1927. Today, the PJM 
region encompasses all or part of thirteen states and the 
District of Columbia, including the entirety of New Jersey. 
PJM operates the largest centrally dispatched power market in 
the world.  
As a regional transmission organization, PJM has two 
responsibilities of significance to this case. First, PJM 
manages the flow of electric energy throughout the regional 
power grid, “dispatching” energy in real time to where it is 
needed. App’x 32. Second, PJM facilitates the interstate sales 
of electricity products, including energy and capacity, by 
managing marketplaces where those products may be 
exchanged. Electric energy is “the actual electricity that 
electric generators produce and which residential and 
business customers ultimately use.” App’x 35 (quotation 
marks omitted). By contrast, electric capacity is “the ability to 
produce [energy] when called upon.” App’x 36 (quotation 
marks omitted). In a system, such as PJM, where multiple 
power generators pool their power, capacity describes the 
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total amount of electricity-generating resources available for 
use. In other words, capacity is to energy what parking spaces 
are to cars—a measure of how much traffic the system can 
accommodate.  
3. New Jersey has moved away from a monopoly 
model for electric power generation and toward a 
market-based model approach. 
New Jersey once followed a traditional utility model, 
regulating local monopolies that both generated and 
distributed power to an exclusive service area. In 1999, 
however, New Jersey enacted the Electric Discount and 
Energy Competition Act, N.J. Stat. § 48:3-49 et seq. The Act 
restructured New Jersey’s electric energy system so 
“customers would have the right to choose their electricity 
suppliers” and so that energy suppliers could obtain their 
energy from wholesale energy markets. App’x 44; see also 
N.J. Stat. § 48.3-50. To this end, New Jersey divorced the 
entities that generate electricity from those that supply it.  
The change produced a delicate circuitry of 
interdependence between private entities and public utilities, 
and between New Jersey and federally-regulated wholesale 
energy markets. Generators, such as coal-fired or natural gas 
power plants, sell their capacity and energy to PJM through 
various PJM auctions. Load-serving entities pay PJM for 
furnishing capacity and energy, and, in turn, sell energy to 
consumers.
1
 Electricity distribution companies, acting as 
                                              
1
 In New Jersey, customers may choose between numerous 
energy suppliers. The major electricity suppliers include 
Atlantic City Electric, Jersey Central Power & Light, 
Rockland Electric, and Public Service Electric & Gas.  
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common carriers, use their network of power lines to transfer 
energy from generators to consumers.  
Although New Jersey restructured its approach to electric 
energy regulation, it did not cede its “authority over the siting 
and construction of power plants.” App’x 44. New Jersey’s 
state utility regulator, the Board of Public Utilities, retained 
statutory authority for “general supervision and regulation of 
and jurisdiction and control over all public utilities.” N.J. Stat. 
§ 48:2-13(a). Pursuant to this authority, New Jersey has, for 
example, asserted jurisdiction over “[t]he charges assessed to 
customers for basic generation service,” id. § 48:3-57(a)(1), 
and the licensing of electric power suppliers, id. § 48:3-78.  
 B. New Jersey passed LCAPP to encourage the 
construction of new power plants. 
Roughly a decade after New Jersey restructured its 
electric power industry, New Jersey’s legislature foresaw 
crisis. The legislature found that “New Jersey is experiencing 
an electric power capacity deficit and high power prices.” 
N.J. Stat. § 48:3-98.2(e). The legislature warned that, “[a]s a 
result of a lack of new, efficient electric generation facilities, 
New Jersey has become more reliant on coal-fired power 
plants.” Id. § 48:3-98.2(f). And the legislature specifically 
found that PJM’s capacity market “has not resulted in large 
additions of peaking facilities or any additions of intermediate 
or base load resources available to the region and the State.” 
N.J. Stat. § 48:3-98.2(b). New Jersey concluded that it needed 
more electric energy generators. 
New Jersey’s legislature enacted LCAPP in January 2011 
to address its concerns. See id. § 48:3-98.3. LCAPP aimed to 
encourage power generation companies to construct new 
power plants in New Jersey in order to add a cumulative 
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2,000 megawatts of capacity to the regional power grid from 
which New Jersey obtained its electrical energy. Id. § 48.3-
98.3(c)(1).  
The legislature fostered additional electric generation in 
New Jersey by furnishing new generators with fifteen-year 
contracts to supply a predetermined amount of capacity at a 
predetermined rate. LCAPP authorized the Board of Public 
Utilities to compel electricity distribution companies to sign 
these contracts. Broadly speaking, these contracts, known as 
Standard Offer Capacity Agreements, guaranteed new 
generators a fixed level of revenue over a fifteen-year 
contract term.  
Pursuant to LCAPP, the Board of Public Utilities solicited 
bids from power generation companies willing and able to 
construct new electric power generation facilities. N.J. Stat. 
§ 48:3-98.3(a)-(b). The Board received bids from thirty-four 
companies to participate in LCAPP, and it selected the 
proposals of appellant CPV Power Development, Inc., 
intervenor-appellant Hess Newark LLC, and amicus NRG 
Energy, Inc. The Board then exercised its authority to compel 
the New Jersey electricity distribution companies to sign 
Standard Offer Capacity Agreements with the LCAPP 
generators. Since then, Hess’s and CPV’s projects have 
moved forward; NRG’s project has not.  
 C. Proceedings to date 
After New Jersey enacted LCAPP, several existing 
electrical energy generators and two electricity distribution 
companies filed suit against the Commissioners of the Board 
of Public Utilities. They sought both a declaration that the 
Federal Power Act preempted LCAPP and an injunction 
prohibiting New Jersey authorities from enforcing LCAPP. 
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CPV intervened to defend the law a few months later. The 
District Court denied both sides’ motions for summary 
judgment. Over thirteen days, the parties tried their case to 
the bench. Witnesses included experts on the electric energy 
industry, including former regulators and corporate 
executives. The trial concluded with a lengthy written opinion 
and a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. See PPL 
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hana, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.N.J. 
2013); App’x 92-94. 
The District Court determined that the Federal Power Act 
preempted LCAPP. The Court concluded that LCAPP 
infringed on FERC’s exclusive control over the price received 
for interstate sales of capacity. Thus, LCAPP had been field 
preempted. The District Court further determined that LCAPP 
interfered with PJM’s method of determining the price of 
capacity. Thus, LCAPP had been conflict preempted. Finally, 
the District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce 
Clause attack on the grounds that they had not met their 
burden of proof. Based on its conclusions, the District Court 
declared LCAPP unconstitutional, invalidated the Standard 
Offer Capacity Agreements, and enjoined New Jersey from 
enforcing the statute.  
The Board of Public Utilities and CPV appealed. Hess 
Newark has since intervened in CPV’s appeal.2 Each side has 
                                              
2
 This Court granted Hess Newark’s motion to intervene and 
consolidated the various proceedings. See Order dated Nov. 
14, 2013, Case No. 13-4330 (granting Hess Newark’s motion 
to intervene); Order dated Dec. 13, 2013, Case No. 13-4330 




been joined on appeal by numerous amici. At the Court’s 
invitation, the United States and FERC, acting amicus curiae, 
also briefed the preemption questions in support of the 
appellees. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
Because of the Constitutional claims presented in the case, 
the District Court properly exercised subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because the 
District Court entered final judgment, we exercise appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“When the district court decides a constitutional claim 
based on a developed factual record, we exercise plenary 
review of the district court’s legal conclusion. We defer to the 
factual findings supporting that conclusion unless they are 
clearly erroneous.” United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  
III. Discussion 
Congress has distinguished between those matters that 
belong exclusively to the federal government, such as 
regulation of interstate sales and transmissions of energy, and 
those matters that remain within the regulatory authority of 
the states, such as the regulation of energy generators. See 16 
U.S.C. § 824(b).  
In the American system of federalism, federal law 
commands primacy over state law. The “Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. As between state 
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and federal law, therefore, any state law that “interferes with 
or is contrary to federal law . . . must yield.” Free v. Bland, 
369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824)).  
Accordingly, if LCAPP intrudes into the exclusively 
federal field or conflicts with valid federal regulation, federal 
law preempts its effect and renders it invalid. See Farina v. 
Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010). If, on the other 
hand, LCAPP addresses a local matter and leaves federal law 
unimpaired, it remains valid. See id. “Pre-emption analysis 
requires us to compare federal and state law.” PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2573 (2011). We do so with “the 
basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace 
state law.” Farina, 625 F.3d. at 116 (alteration omitted) 
(quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). 
Only a clear and manifest conflict with federal law, or clear 
and manifest Congressional intent to override state choices, 
will overcome the presumption against preemption. Id. at 117. 
 A. Comparing LCAPP’s subject matter to the 
federal regulation of interstate sales and transmissions of 
energy 
The core of this case concerns field preemption, 
specifically whether LCAPP has strayed into the exclusive 
federal area of interstate wholesale rates. This begs the 
question of what the federal government and New Jersey have 
each regulated. Accordingly, within the broader framework 
described in Part I, we must fill in some of the details of 
PJM’s FERC-approved approach to setting market prices and 





 In practice, FERC, through PJM, 
regulates aspects of interstate wholesale rates through a 
capacity auction, while LCAPP encourages the construction 
of new generators by arranging for a capacity price 
supplement. We determine that LCAPP effectively sets 
capacity prices and therefore regulates the same field 
occupied by FERC.  
1. Through regional transmission organizations, 
FERC uses market mechanisms to price and sell 
electric capacity. 
Although the Federal Power Act speaks to interstate 
wholesales of electric energy, “the wholesale price for 
capacity . . . is squarely, and indeed exclusively, within 
FERC’s jurisdiction.” N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. F.E.R.C., 744 
F.3d 74, 97 (3d Cir. 2014). FERC has determined that 
“maintaining adequate resources” bears “a significant and 
direct effect on” wholesale rates. PJM Interconnection, 
L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61318, at 40 (2007). Therefore, FERC 
regulates interstate sales of electric capacity as part of its 
approach to regulating electric energy rates. See 
Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC, 378 F.3d 303, 
305 (3d Cir. 2004). 
                                              
3
 We recite the factual details necessary to decide the 
preemption question before us, resting on the careful factual 
findings of the District Court. In a related case, our Court 
described the federal and state regulatory schemes in greater 
detail. See generally N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. F.E.R.C., 744 
F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014).  
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FERC has approved PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model as 
the means to set the interstate wholesale price for electric 
capacity in the PJM region. The Reliability Pricing Model 
attempts to match supply of capacity to demand for capacity. 
To calculate demand, PJM uses data from market participants 
and sophisticated computer models. To calculate supply, PJM 
uses two mechanisms. First, PJM tabulates all generation 
capacity within the PJM region that has been prearranged 
between suppliers and users of energy. This includes, for 
example, capacity associated with state-run monopolies or 
capacity privately exchanged between load-serving entities 
and energy generators. Second, PJM uses an auction to obtain 
the additional capacity needed to meet projected demand. The 
winners of the auction agree to provide capacity to PJM. See 
generally PJM Capacity Market Operations, PJM Manual 18: 
PJM Capacity Market §§ 3 (“Demand in the Reliability 
Pricing Model”), 4 (“Supply Resources in the Reliability 
Pricing Model”) (21st ed. 2014). 
The Reliability Pricing Model is a forward market and 
focuses on the capacity to be demanded and supplied for a 
one-year period beginning three years in the future. For 
example, the 2014-2015 Model settled capacity obligations 
for 2017-2018. And if the model has functioned properly, in 
three-years’ time PJM will have contracted with enough 
capacity providers to satisfy the peak demand for capacity 
during 2017-2018. 
Within the Reliability Pricing Model, the Base Residual 
Auction establishes the price capacity providers will receive 
for residual capacity supplied to PJM. Providers propose an 
amount of capacity they will offer to PJM, say 1,000 
megawatt-hours per day, and the price at which they will 
offer that capacity, say $500 per megawatt per day. PJM 
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orders these bids from lowest in price to highest in price. PJM 
then accepts bids, starting with the lowest-price bid, until the 
cumulative capacity it has accepted satisfies PJM’s auction 
goal. At that point, PJM rejects all other bids. The price of the 
last accepted bid becomes the price PJM will pay for all 
accepted auction bids. For example, if the $500 bid is the last 
one needed to satisfy demand, for example, $500 becomes the 
auction “clearing price.” App’x 48.  
2. New Jersey, through LCAPP and the Standard 
Offer Capacity Agreements, has legislated what 
rates LCAPP generators will receive for their sales 
of capacity.   
By design, LCAPP focuses on capacity and capacity 
prices. Recall that the contracts here are standard offer 
capacity agreements contemplated by the Long Term 
Capacity Agreement Pilot Program. See N.J. Stat. § 48:3-51. 
And the Standard Offer Capacity Agreement price—referred 
to as the Standard Offer Capacity Price—is “the capacity 
price that is fixed for the term of the [agreement] and which is 
the price to be received by eligible generators under a board-
approved [agreement].” Id. 
New Jersey’s legislature charged the Board of Public 
Utilities with implementing LCAPP to achieve New Jersey’s 
stated policy goal of providing long-term price assurance to 
new energy generators. See id. § 48:3-98.3(c)(4). The Board 
did so by focusing on capacity and capacity prices: 
 First, the Board “awarded” each generator a specific 
amount of capacity to transact through its Standard 
Offer Capacity Agreement.  
 Second, the Board required generators to “participate 
in and clear” PJM’s annual capacity auction. N.J. Stat. 
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§ 48:3-98.3(c)(12). Thus, when NRG’s bid failed to 
clear the PJM auction, its LCAPP participation ended.  
 Third, the Board guaranteed each generator a fixed 
price for its cleared capacity. The Board achieved this 
by attempting to structure the Standard Offer Capacity 
Agreements as contracts-for-differences between the 
price of capacity received by a generator from the PJM 
auction and a price fixed by the Agreement itself. If the 
Agreement price exceeded the auction price, the 
Agreement required the electricity distribution 
companies to pay the difference in price, multiplied by 
the amount of capacity, to the LCAPP generators. If 
the auction price exceeded the Agreement price, the 
Agreement obliged the LCAPP generators to pay the 
difference in price, multiplied by the amount of 
capacity, to the electricity distribution companies.  
In practice, the Standard Offer Capacity Agreements 
offered financial assurance to LCAPP generators: for a fixed 
amount of capacity, generators would receive a fixed price. 
And the Agreements extended these assurances for a fifteen-
year term, with the price increasing each year.  
3. Both FERC, through PJM, and New Jersey attempt 
to regulate electric capacity prices and sales. 
FERC, acting through PJM, uses the Base Residual 
Auction to fix the capacity price electric generators will 
receive for the capacity they sell through PJM. At the same 
time, New Jersey, through LCAPP, has legislated that LCAPP 
generators will both receive the federal price for interstate 
capacity sales and also receive an additional amount fixed by 




We determine that LCAPP, through the Standard Offer 
Capacity Agreements, attempts to regulate the same subject 
matter that FERC has regulated through PJM’s Reliability 
Pricing Model. The Agreements guarantee LCAPP generators 
a “multiyear pricing supplement” to raise the prevailing 
capacity price to an amount of New Jersey’s liking. App’x 59. 
Indeed, New Jersey regulated the Standard Offer Capacity 
Rates precisely because the legislature believed that PJM’s 
market-based incentives had failed to encourage new electric 
generators to construct adequate electric generation facilities. 
N.J. Stat. § 48:3-98.2(b). LCAPP builds on PJM’s capacity 
prices. 
Accordingly, New Jersey misses the mark when it argues 
that each Standard Offer Capacity Agreement represents “a 
contract for differences, functioning like a hedge” and, 
therefore, does not transact in capacity. See, e.g., CPV Br. 39. 
True, LCAPP’s price assurance insulates LCAPP generators 
from market volatility and thus eliminates their risk. But the 
Agreements provide more than risk-hedging; they provide for 
the supply and sale of capacity, as well. LCAPP commands 
generators to sell capacity to PJM. In return, New Jersey’s 
statute ensures that the generators will receive the Standard 
Offer Capacity Rate for each quantity of capacity offered at 
auction and not solely the auction price they would have 
otherwise received. Accordingly, we agree with the District 
Court that “the Board essentially sets a price for wholesale 
energy sales” for LCAPP generators. App’x 78; accord PPL 
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 476 (4th Cir. 
2014) (determining that a Maryland initiative similar to 
LCAPP “functionally sets the rate that [a generator] receives 
for its sales in the PJM auction”). 
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Anticipating this result, LCAPP’s defenders contend that 
if the Standard Offer Capacity Agreements set capacity prices 
then the law would not be preempted because the 
reasonableness of the Agreement’s rates would be within 
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction to review. True, FERC has 
jurisdiction over certain contracts that set rates between 
market participants. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 171 (2010). But this argument 
conflates the inquiry into LCAPP’s field of regulation with an 
inquiry into the reasonableness of the Standard Offer 
Capacity Rates. Here, whether the Standard Offer Capacity 
Agreements pick “just and reasonable” capacity prices is 
beside the point. What matters is that the Agreements have set 
capacity prices in the first place.  
 B. Because New Jersey has legislated in an 
exclusively federal field, its law must give way. 
Because FERC has exercised control over the field of 
interstate capacity prices, and because FERC’s control is 
exclusive, New Jersey’s efforts to regulate the same subject 
matter cannot stand. “Where Congress has delegated the 
authority to regulate a particular field to an administrative 
agency, the agency’s regulations issued pursuant to that 
authority have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes, 
assuming those regulations are a valid exercise of the 
agency’s delegated authority.” Fellner v. Tri–Union Seafoods, 
L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, FERC’s use 
of the Base Residual Auction to set interstate capacity prices 
is a lawful exercise of its authority. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. 
Utils., 744 F.3d at 97. Indeed, only FERC has the authority to 
set interstate capacity prices. Id. So the Federal Power Act, as 
administered by FERC, preempts and, therefore, invalidates, 
state intrusions into the field. Cf. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n 
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v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). New Jersey’s 
regulations must yield. 
LCAPP’s defenders respond that New Jersey’s 
interference with capacity prices does not trigger preemption 
because it is a lawful exercise of the state’s authority to 
promote new generation resources. New Jersey does have 
authority over local energy matters, including the 
construction of power plants. See, e.g., So. Cal. Edison Co. & 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61,269, at 3 (1995). 
But LCAPP incentivizes the construction of new power plants 
by regulating the rates new electric generators will receive for 
their capacity. New Jersey could have used other means to 
achieve its policy goals.
4
 Because Congress has evinced its 
intent to occupy the entire field of interstate capacity rates, 
however, New Jersey’s reasons for regulating in the federal 
field cannot save its effort: “any state law falling within that 
[federal] field is preempted.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).  
That New Jersey has attempted to regulate federal matters 
for local purposes also distinguishes its situation from 
Northwest Central Pipeline v. State Corp. Commission of 
Kansas, 489 U.S. 493, 512-13 (1989). There, the U.S. 
                                              
4
 For example, permissible means may include “utilization of 
tax exempt bonding authority, the granting of property tax 
relief, the ability to enter into favorable site lease agreements 
on public lands, the gifting of environmentally damaged 
properties for brownfield development, and the relaxing or 
acceleration of permit approvals.” App’x 74. New Jersey may 
also directly subsidize generators so long as the subsidies do 
not essentially set wholesale prices. 
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Supreme Court rejected the argument that Kansas 
overstepped its authority to regulate the gathering of natural 
gas by promulgating rules that, if enforced, would indirectly 
affect interstate rates. Id. at 512-14. By contrast, LCAPP does 
not regulate the construction of new power plants, causing an 
incidental effect on the interstate price of capacity. Rather, 
LCAPP sets a price of capacity that will lead to the 
construction of new power plants. New Jersey cannot excuse 
LCAPP’s interference with capacity prices as incidental to its 
scheme because the statute’s explicit objective is to 
supplement capacity prices.  
Nor can the statute be saved by the fact that its design 
incorporates, rather than repudiates, PJM’s capacity auction 
clearing price. Recall that PJM pays generators for the 
capacity they supply to PJM, and it charges load-serving 
entities for the proportional share of the capacity they obtain 
though PJM. LCAPP supplements what the generators 
receive from PJM with an additional payment financed by 
payments from electric distribution companies, the public 
utilities that own local transmission lines. Because electricity 
distribution companies do not participate in PJM’s capacity 
auction, and because PJM still pays generators the auction 
clearing price, LCAPP artfully steps around the capacity 
transactions facilitated by PJM. The arrangement does not 
save the law. “[I]f FERC has jurisdiction over a subject, the 
States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject.” See 
Miss. Power & Light Co. v Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 
377 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, we agree with the 
Fourth Circuit that “[t]he fact that [these sorts of payments] 
do[] not formally upset the terms of a federal transaction is no 
defense, since the functional results are precisely the same.” 
Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 477. The generators receive a different 
29 
 
price for the capacity they clear through PJM than what 
FERC intended.  
IV. The Federal Field has Limits 
Counsel to various state amici describe the District 
Court’s preemption decision as unprecedented:  
This is the first time we 
have a state law to address 
state long-term energy 
needs under a state 
procurement paid for by 
state rate payers, [that] is 
nonetheless deemed to be 
field preempted under the 
Federal Power Act as well 
as conflict preempted 
because it might have an 
effect on the market when 
anything a state does for 
generation will have [an] 
effect. 
Tr. of Oral Argument at 32:02-09 (March 27, 2014). In 
particular, LCAPP’s defenders fret that a decision in favor of 
preemption will hamstring state-led efforts to develop 
renewable and reliable electric energy resources.  
However broadly we might have decided this case, our 
holding today focuses instead on the field of interstate rates 
and, in particular, on capacity prices. Because we agree with 
the District Court that LCAPP and the Standard Offer 
Capacity Agreements attempt to regulate an exclusively 
federal field, we do not decide whether the District Court also 
correctly determined that LCAPP “poses as an obstacle” to 
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PJM’s markets and has been conflict preempted. See App’x 
86. Thus, we have no occasion to conclude that PJM’s 
markets preempt any state act that might intersect a market 
rule. 
Nor do we endorse the argument that LCAPP has been 
field preempted because it affects the market clearing price by 
increasing the supply of electric capacity. Cf. FERC & United 
States Amicus Br. 11-17. Holding all else constant, an 
increase in capacity resources will cause supply to satisfy 
demand at a lower price. So LCAPP has the theoretical ability 
to influence the wholesale price of energy and capacity in 
PJM by enlarging the supply of capacity. If any effect on 
interstate markets could trigger preemption, LCAPP would be 
irredeemably flawed.  
But the law of supply-and-demand is not the law of 
preemption. When a state regulates within its sphere of 
authority, the regulation’s incidental effect on interstate 
commerce does not render the regulation invalid. Nw. Cent. 
Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S. at 514. Accordingly, we do not view 
LCAPP’s incidental effects on the interstate wholesale price 
of electric capacity as the basis of its preemption problem. 
Indeed, were we to determine otherwise, the states might be 
left with no authority whatsoever to regulate power plants 
because every conceivable regulation would have some effect 
on operating costs or available supply. That is not the law. 
The states may select the type of generation to be built—wind 
or solar, gas or coal—and where to build the facility. Or states 
may elect to build no electric generation facilities at all. See 
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. F.E.R.C., 569 F.3d 477, 
481 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The states’ regulatory choices 
accumulate into the available supply transacted through the 
interstate market. The Federal Power Act grants FERC 
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exclusive control over whether interstate rates are “just and 
reasonable,” but FERC’s authority over interstate rates does 
not carry with it exclusive control over any and every force 
that influences interstate rates. Unless and until Congress 
determines otherwise, the states maintain a regulatory role in 
the nation’s electric energy markets. Today’s decision does 
not diminish that important responsibility. 
V. Conclusion 
We affirm the District Court’s judgment. LCAPP compels 
participants in a federally-regulated marketplace to transact 
capacity at prices other than the price fixed by the 
marketplace. By legislating capacity prices, New Jersey has 
intruded into an area reserved exclusively for the federal 
government. Accordingly, federal statutory and regulatory 
law preempts and, thereby, invalidates LCAPP and the 
Standard Offer Capacity Agreements. 
In deciding that LCAPP has been field preempted because 
it sets capacity rates, we do not accept the argument that field 
preemption will occur whenever a state’s legislation 
indirectly affects matters within FERC’s jurisdiction. By 
statute and tradition, states have a role to play in energy 
markets. 
